Intellectual Property Lawyer

According to the meaning of Article 1228 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, each result of intellectual activity has an author who created his creation through creative work. At the same time, creative work does not include technical, consulting, organizational or material assistance or support, control over the creation of the result, assistance in registering rights to such a result or in its use. The same applies to objects of copyright (Article 1257 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation). From this it seems clear that, according to the meaning of the legislation, works can be considered as such and have copyright protection only if there was creative work in their creation. Roughly speaking, the Civil Code seems to declare that not everything can be recognized as a work — what is not creative is not an object of copyright. As if the results of life activity have some intellectual and legal threshold-standard, upon crossing which the phenomenon can be recognized as a result of intellectual activity and, in particular, protected by copyright.

But at the same time, paragraph 80 of Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 10 of April 23, 2019 "On the Application of Part Four of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation" establishes several provisions:

● until proven otherwise, the results of intellectual activity are presumed to be created by creative work;
● the mere absence of novelty, uniqueness and (or) originality of the result of intellectual activity cannot indicate that such a result was not created by creative work and, therefore, is not an object of copyright;
● the creative nature of the creation of a work does not depend on whether the work was created by the author personally or using technical means; results created with the help of technical means in the absence of the creative nature of human activity are not subject to copyright protection.

The "Plenum" stated that the presence of creative work in an object is assumed "by default" unless the defendant proves otherwise. Thus, the current legislation, taking into account the law enforcement practice of the highest judicial authorities, establishes a presumption of the presence of a creative beginning in the creation of an object of copyright, which can be refuted when considering a specific case in relation to the relevant work. The refutation of this presumption relates to the burden of proof of the defendant, who must confirm that the work, in defense of the rights to which the claim is filed, was not created by the creative work of a person.

In a sense, such regulation can be understood: the absence of such a presumption would oblige each plaintiff to prove the presence of creative work in the protected copyright object, which would force judges to act as "art critics" (and the doctrine of intellectual property law is strongly against this; moreover, such sentiments are an international phenomenon), and because of this, the factor of the possibility of proving the copyright protection of the object would be completely unpredictable. Especially if we take into account that in the vast majority of arbitration disputes on the protection of copyright since 2019, defendants have not been able to refute the presumption of the presence of creativity.

On the other hand, the "creative threshold-standard" has long existed in other jurisdictions: the USA and Germany, for example — therefore, such an element must be paid attention to in the event of a dispute subject to consideration on the territory of a foreign state and (or) when applying the law of this state. This concept does not avoid discussions in any case, but, in general, the point of view that it is necessary to protect by copyright only those objects that have a recognizable element of creative contribution seems quite logical. And this worldview is sometimes reflected in Russian judicial practice.

Two years after the presumption of creativity was established in the "plenum on intellectual property", the Supreme Court issued ruling No. 5-KG21−14-K2 in case No. 3−466/2019, which completely contradicts the previously expressed statement about the optionality of the criteria of novelty, uniqueness and (or) originality in a work: "Taking into account the wording of the claims, in order to correctly resolve the dispute, the court had to establish what exactly the plaintiff considered to be an object of copyright subject to protection, whether it is really an object of copyright, and whether it belongs to the plaintiff. It should be noted that, according to the generally accepted approach, an object that satisfies the originality condition may receive copyright protection even if its implementation was conditioned by technical considerations, provided that this does not prevent the author from reflecting his personality in this object, exercising his free will, choice; when the components of the object are characterized only by their technical function, the criterion of originality is not met. Thus, in order to resolve the issue of granting legal protection to an object, it is necessary to establish whether its author, by choosing the form of the product, has demonstrated his creative abilities in an original way, making a free and creative choice and modeling the product in such a way as to reflect his personality, whether it is an original work, a result of intellectual creativity due to the fact that through this form the author of the work expresses his creative abilities in an original way, making a free and creative choice, reflecting his personality."

In principle, the vacillation between the presumption of creativity and the creative threshold-standard is understandable even to a person far from the field of intellectual property rights. Few people are happy with the "declaration of everything as copyright objects by default", which provides copyright protection to the most trivial results — in the case SIP-818/2018, a nondescript, banal and absolutely inexpressive logo was designated as a work.

Further, to the displeasure of opponents of the presumption of creativity, in case A41−71 143/2023 it was stated that the typicality or lack of originality of individual design elements of objects does not mean the absence of a creative contribution to the creation of the objects and, accordingly, does not indicate that the said objects as a whole are not copyright objects subject to legal protection (approximately the same logic is given in A60−23 052/2023). In its decision on case A53−967/2023, the Rostov Region Arbitration Court stated the following: "Products made of natural stone, not including complex architectural elements, may have a common visual appearance, but this does not mean that the author did not use intellectual and creative work when creating the creative concept of the images of these products. The author was faced with the task of visualizing the creative concept in the finished design of the catalog and each product image separately so that the product images in the catalog and individually attract potential buyers."

Dissatisfaction with this situation is manifested in the presence in Russian judicial practice of a certain vague tradition of occasionally declaring: "Not all crafts are works of art!" For example, in ruling No. C01−57/2014 on case No. A24−1669/2013, the Intellectual Property Court indicated that when considering claims for compensation for copyright infringement, the court should establish whether a specific result of the activity of an individual or legal entity is an object of copyright, regardless of whether this was declared by the parties to the process. Or again: the Arbitration Court of the Sverdlovsk Region in A60−35 385/2010independently examined the work and came to the conclusion that "… the disputed composite design cannot be an object of copyright, since it does not allow it to be considered as a result of creative activity, since there is no novelty, originality of the named object and other qualities that allow us to conclude that this object is the result of creative activity … when developing the design of this print, the plaintiff did not need special skills and training, since the plaintiff used the following as constituent elements: the coat of arms of the city of Yekaterinburg and the name of the city, which was made in a certain type and size of font and located above the coat of arms. Originality and uniqueness in the selection and arrangement of the material … is not seen. "

In approximately the same direction in 2021, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation led. But at the moment, all judicial practice on the protection of copyright is based on the presumption of creativity, which is very difficult for defendants to refute. We examined one case of a successful refutation of this order in jewelry cases, but this is an isolated case. Defendants generally fail to get the courts to state that the disputed work is not a work at all. But we should immediately note that defendants almost never involve specialists in such proceedings, do not seek the appointment of forensic examinations (they will not be appointed just like that — at a minimum, you must either involve a specialist or provide written evidence in the case — an "extra-judicial examination" - in which the findings of a competent individual will indicate the absence of a creative contribution to the creation of the object).

The overwhelming majority of arbitration cases in which the presumption of creativity is challenged are disputes over the protection of copyright in photographs. The problem for defendants in such proceedings is that judicial practice directly and openly states that the process of creating any photograph or video recording has the characteristics of creative activity, which is the recording of various reflections of a constantly changing reality using technical means. The courts understand the following actions of a photographer as creative activity: choosing an exposure, placing the subject of a photograph in space, choosing one’s own position for taking a photograph, setting up the light and/or adapting one’s location and the location of the subject of a photograph to the available lighting, selecting light filters for the lens, setting the shutter speed, adjusting the aperture, adjusting the sharpness of the frame, and processing the resulting image using special computer programs (for digital cameras).

Thus, any photograph taken by a professional photographer is an object of copyright, and it is almost impossible to circumvent the presumption of creative work here (although practice has not yet known of involving a specialist in such a case, while the process of proof for defendants can be frankly strange: for example, in case A07−22 502/2023, the defendant tried to prove to the court that elements of a series of photographs were the result of accidentally pressing the camera shutter button). In case A40−142 764/2023, the defendant’s argument about the absence of creative work in creating the photograph was countered by the fact that in order to obtain a photograph, the angle must be selected, one’s own position and exposure must be chosen, appropriate professional equipment must be used and adjusted, and the necessary lens must be selected. In case A40−27 866/2023, the defendant argued that photographs of goods (clothing) should not be recognized as objects of copyright due to the lack of creative work in them, to which the court responded: "In the present case, the disputed photographic works were not created using recording devices operating in automatic mode, but with the direct participation of the photographer — from the stage of preparation for the photo shoot to the final processing of the resulting images on a computer in order to obtain photographs of clothing models on a white background without foreign elements … The photographer performed actions to install and configure the photographic equipment, place a mannequin with a clothing model, install a white background, select a position and angle relative to the objects of photography, adjust the light, take photographs and subsequently process the resulting images using special computer programs. Contrary to the defendant’s claims, the preparation of all the disputed photographs without performing the above actions, primarily without the photographer choosing a certain angle and placing the object of the photograph in space, would in fact be impossible."

But in the decision on case A40−229 465/2023, it can be found that the videographer did not take any preparatory measures — he filmed a fight between football fans. The defendant posted this video on his Telegram channel, for which he received a lawsuit for copyright infringement. Of course, the channel administrator claimed that there was no creative work in creating the video. But the court, reminding the defendant about "recording various reflections of a constantly changing reality", replied: "The fact of filming video material in an emergency situation does not indicate a lack of creative contribution. According to the defendant, the author’s goal in filming was to reliably document information about a current event, and not to create a work of literature, science or art. Meanwhile, this argument also does not indicate a lack of creative contribution in creating the video material."

Although, with all this, the Intellectual Property Court in case A76−3831/2022 indicated that the simple cropping of a photographic work is not the result of creative work. But the photo was not cropped by the photographer, otherwise who knows what conclusion one could come to…

But let us again pay attention to the definition of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation from 2021, which indicated the need to study the object in order to establish the presence of such factors as the manifestation of creative abilities in an original way, making a free creative choice and expressing the author’s personality in the work. In fact, this conclusion is fully consistent with the spirit of copyright, which always adheres to the closest connection between the work and the personality of its author — including in the matter of the internal experience of creative work.

"The criterion of creativity is presented not to the object itself, but to the activity of the person in creating it" - the conclusion in case A40−204 323/2023. As the Civil Division of the Moscow City Court indicated in case No. 33−26 418/2015: "The main criterion for recognizing a particular result as a protected object of copyright is the independent efforts of the author (co-authors) to create it, which lead to the emergence of a work that is different from other works of the same kind. Therefore, evidence of the creative nature of a particular object can be its difference from other objects of the same kind." But, unfortunately, the "troika" of judges did not indicate the methodology for measuring the differences.

Thus, legally significant creativity must be grasped not in the result-in-itself, but in its inseparable connection with the author, whose conscious phenomena in this case are of decisive importance (what then to do with an author who is incapacitated due to a mental disorder? Can the law recognize creative work here? Can a mentally ill author create works in the legal sense? And if this is possible: what rights to this work may arise? Will the personal non-property rights of the author figure here, or can such a creator create works without copyright, with the exception of the exclusive rights that arise for guardians?). In this sense, creative work is very close to moral harm — both phenomena appear to be an internal phenomenological experience that cannot be ideally captured and reflected using a utilitarian system of counting and converting this experience into an objective systemic denominator (as a result, the determination of the amount of moral harm or the presence of creative work is dictated by socio-economic, cultural and law enforcement circumstances-traditions, and the recognition of the presence/absence of creative work in an object situationally can even be a political gesture).

So, the law is more concerned with the author’s internal attitude to the elements of novelty, uniqueness and originality in a work than with the expression of these categories in the work itself in the perception of other persons. Therefore, the theory of intellectual property speaks of subjective novelty — the absence of conscious or unconscious copying of other works.

In this regard, one can see many conclusions in the doctrine, following from rather naive everyday sayings: "Creativity is chaos; creativity is free; creativity is semi-random." But there are several difficulties here: firstly, the temptation to apply an aesthetic criterion (and such a criterion exists in Portuguese law, for example) will collide with the difference in the objects of copyright. We will not be able to apply the same mechanism for detecting aesthetics to works of art/literature, works of science, computer programs, databases and geographic maps. Secondly, the above statements vulgarly level out the discursiveness of the creative process and the presence of extra-individual prerequisites in it. Thirdly, the expression "art = chaos" is more characteristic of trivial reflection than of strict disciplines (let's take, for example, Gilles Deleuze, who directly responds to such a misconception: "…precisely because the canvas is initially covered with all sorts of clichés, the artist has to attack chaos and rush with destruction in order to create a sensation that is not subject to any opinion and any cliché (for how long?). Art is not chaos, but a composition of chaos that gives a vision or a feeling… Art fights chaos, but in order to make it tangible…). Even more so, there can be no talk of any chaos when creating, for example, a database.

But the above-mentioned commonly used statements have their effect on legal scholars, so A.O. Kositsky resorts to the conclusion that the creative result is an undefined result. Moreover, non-determination acts as a certain assessment-measure of the factor that the cause-and-effect relationships in the creation of a copyright object are "implicit". Unfortunately, the proposed measurement of "explicit/implicit" is hardly valid, especially since it already has its own problems in other areas of law. But the path itself through the assessment of determinism seems deeply erroneous.

Such a theory inevitably encounters obstacles in the form of derivative and composite works (Article 1260 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation), which are "explicitly" determined by their legal nature. Translation is always determined by the original. A program created on the basis of "free open source software" is also determined. Composite works (collections) are predictable with a certain degree of probability. But let us give an even more radical example.

In Crime and Punishment by F. M. Dostoevsky, inspiration from Edgar Allan Poe’s story "The Tell-Tale Heart" is clearly visible — the leitmotif problem and the main plot skeleton of both works are very similar, if not conceptually identical. A. S. Lukhanina conducted an excellent philological study of Poe's reminiscences in Dostoevsky's story. Let us also recall that "The Tell-Tale Heart" was first published in Russian in Dostoevsky's magazine "Time", after which Fyodor Mikhailovich wrote a review of three stories by Poe. In general, Dostoevsky read "The Tell-Tale Heart", and the connection between this work and "Crime and Punishment" is a long-standing and hackneyed narrative in philology, literary criticism, cultural studies and other fields of knowledge, with the obvious exception of jurisprudence.

But here we can ask a question about the methodology expressed earlier: "Can Crime and Punishment really be called an indeterminate work?" The problem is that the claims about the "indeterminacy" of the results of creativity are flatly denied by any cultural, sociological, philosophical, linguistic, philological or historical analysis. That is, such an approach does not engage in any criticism of the methods in such types of analysis, it simply unceremoniously and indiscriminately rejects them.

By the way, it is interesting that arbitration judicial practice contains a certain counterargument: in one of the "jewelry cases" we examined, the involved specialist explained that the disputed design work was not invented "out of nowhere" - it was a certain product of the determination of cultural phenomena of the 70s. The court rejected the claim on the basis that ideas and concepts are not objects of copyright. In general, the possibility of establishing determinism depends on the competence and sphere of knowledge of the individual interacting with the work.

Didn’t Greek literature determine all subsequent literature? And what about the idea of the monomyth? How should we treat Jorge Luis Borges' essay "Kafka and His Predecessors"? Without departing from this author, what should we do with his essay "Four Cycles", in which he expresses the idea of basing all world literature on four plots ("There are only four stories. And no matter how much time is left for us, we will retell them — in one form or another")? Do cultural studies and art criticism have a right to exist? If the intellectual-legal hypothesis of "explicit/implicit determination" offers anything, it is the opportunity to once again be convinced of the correctness of not allowing lawyers-judges to act as critics of culture.

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In general, this topic deserves a separate article, and not a consultation on the page on legal services of a lawyer. But, to summarize, we can say the following: in Russian intellectual property law (namely, in copyright law) there is a presumption of the presence of a creative beginning in each object, which must be refuted by the defendant. The most effective way to do this is to bring in specialized competent individuals (engage a specialist or seek the appointment of an expert) in the relevant field and at the same time "push through" the psychological aspect of the creation of the object by the author through the formation of a statement about the absence of any efforts or diligence in the work of the one who is presumed to be the author of the presumed work.

The Intellectual Property Court of the Russian Federation is a specialized arbitration court created to hear cases related to the protection of intellectual property rights. It plays a key role in ensuring the observance of the rights of authors, inventors, trademark holders and other forms of intellectual property.

The following categories of cases are subject to the jurisdiction of the Intellectual Property Court of the Russian Federation:

as a court of first instance:

• cases on challenging regulatory legal acts of federal executive bodies in the sphere of patent rights and rights to selection achievements, rights to topographies of integrated circuits, rights to production secrets (know-how), rights to means of individualization of legal entities, goods, works, services and enterprises, rights to use the results of intellectual activity as part of a single technology;
• cases on challenging acts of federal executive bodies in the sphere of patent rights and rights to selection achievements, rights to topographies of integrated circuits, rights to production secrets (know-how), rights to means of individualization of legal entities, goods, works, services and enterprises, rights to use the results of intellectual activity as part of a single technology, containing clarifications of legislation and possessing normative properties;
• cases on disputes on granting or terminating legal protection for the results of intellectual activity and equivalent means of individualization of legal entities, goods, works, services and enterprises (except for objects of copyright and related rights, topographies of integrated circuits), including:
• on challenging non-regulatory legal acts, decisions and actions (inaction) of the federal executive body for intellectual property, the federal executive body for selection achievements and their officials, as well as bodies authorized by the Government of the Russian Federation to consider applications for the issuance of a patent for secret inventions;
• on challenging the decision of the federal antimonopoly body on recognizing as unfair competition actions related to the acquisition of an exclusive right to means of individualization of a legal entity, goods, works, services and enterprises;
• on establishing the patent holder;
• on invalidating a patent for an invention, utility model, industrial design or selection achievement, decisions on granting legal protection to a trademark, name of place of origin of goods and on granting an exclusive right to such name, unless federal law provides for a different procedure for recognizing them as invalid; on early termination of legal protection of a trademark due to its non-use.

as a court of cassation:

• cases considered by it at first instance;
• cases on the protection of intellectual rights considered by arbitration courts of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation at first instance, arbitration appellate courts.

The Intellectual Property Court of the Russian Federation also applies to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation with a request to verify the constitutionality of the law applied or to be applied in the case under consideration, studies and summarizes judicial practice, prepares proposals for improving laws and other regulatory legal acts and analyzes judicial statistics. The Intellectual Property Court often issues very important reviews of judicial practice in the field of intellectual property, as well as other documents containing explanations that significantly affect the interpretation of IP legislation.

Violation of exclusive rights to the results of intellectual activity and (or) means of individualization does not always constitute a violation of antitrust legislation, as is for some reason considered outside legal circles. To begin with, it is necessary to analyze what happened and establish several factors.

The first is whether the potential plaintiff and defendant are competitors, i.e. economic entities competing in the same commodity market, provided that the independent actions of these persons exclude or limit the possibility of each of them to unilaterally influence the general conditions of circulation of the relevant goods? If at this stage we receive a negative answer, then the possibility of a dispute under antitrust legislation is cancelled, and we are faced with an ordinary civil case on the illegal use of intellectual property. If the answer is affirmative, then we examine the next factor.

Can the action taken by the potential defendant be regarded as aimed at obtaining advantages in the course of business activities, does it contradict the legislation of the Russian Federation, business customs, requirements of integrity, reasonableness and fairness, did it cause losses (or create a threat of causing losses) and did it harm the business reputation of the potential plaintiff (or create a threat of causing harm)? If this factor coincides with the situation, then the actions of the violator can be qualified as an act of unfair competition in accordance with Chapter 2.1 of the Federal Law of 26.07.2006 N 135-FZ Federal Law "On Protection of Competition" .

Antimonopoly disputes are considered not only by the Federal Antimonopoly Service — the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of March 4, 2021 "On certain issues arising in connection with the application of antimonopoly legislation by the courts" in paragraph 61 indicates that business entities have the right to independently apply to the court with a claim for recognition of actions as violating antimonopoly legislation, including a claim for recognition of the actions of the copyright holder as an act of unfair competition, as well as a claim for compensation for damages caused as a result of an antimonopoly violation. In the next paragraph of the "plenum", the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation speaks of the absence in the Federal Law "On Protection of Competition" of a requirement for mandatory application to the antimonopoly authority for the protection of violated rights before filing an application to the court. "Consequently, if a person applies to the court for the protection of his rights without first filing a corresponding application to the antimonopoly authority, the court cannot leave such an application without consideration." Thus, the business entity has a certain choice: to file a claim either with an arbitration court or with an antimonopoly authority.

What needs to be analyzed is what demands, in addition to recognizing the defendant’s actions as an act of unfair competition, does the plaintiff intend to make? For example, a demand for damages or compensation for the violation of the exclusive right to an intellectual property object. If there are no such intentions, then it is definitely worth limiting yourself to contacting the antimonopoly authority. If they are, then when choosing a strategy for contacting the authorities, you must proceed from the following:

Firstly, it is worth noting that the limitation period for a claim for damages or compensation for violation of an exclusive right is suspended for the period of consideration of the case on violation of antimonopoly legislation. After the expiration of the terms for consideration of the case or the antimonopoly authority’s decision on the case, the limitation period continues to run — therefore, the risk of expiration of the limitation period in the case of an appeal to the FAS is minimal (the human factor on the part of the plaintiff is already at play here) or is absent altogether.

Secondly, if the violation of antimonopoly legislation was not established by the antimonopoly authority, the burden of proving the fact of violation of antimonopoly legislation, including conducting a market analysis, is placed on the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff will be forced to independently and at his own expense involve persons to conduct an analysis of the state of competition in the commodity market. In the event that the case on violation of antimonopoly legislation did take place and ended in the antimonopoly authority, the plaintiff is released from proving the fact of violation of antimonopoly legislation, as well as justifying the legitimate interest in protecting his rights — he will only need to attach the decision made on the case to the statement of claim, and the antimonopoly authority will be involved in the case as a third party that does not make independent claims. The court will request from the FAS evidence important for the case, including an analytical report on the results of the analysis of the state of competition in the commodity market. As a result: it will be much easier for the plaintiff who has gone through the FAS to act in court.

Thirdly, filing an application with the antimonopoly authority is not subject to a state fee.

Fourthly, due to the lower caseload compared to the arbitration courts of first instance (at the same time, it is not at all possible to say that the FAS employees are idle), in the antimonopoly authority one can often find a more attentive and thoughtful attitude to the initiated case, and the commission’s meetings can be longer than the meetings in the arbitration court, cut out according to the principle of "5 minutes and we postpone on far-fetched grounds."

Therefore, I am inclined to the strategy of resolving a dispute about an act of unfair competition in the antimonopoly authority with a subsequent appeal to the court in order to satisfy monetary claims.

In accordance with paragraph 2 of clause 3 of Article 1483 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, state registration of designations as trademarks is not permitted if the designation or its elements are contrary to public interests, principles of humanity and morality. This aspect is verified based on the perception of this designation by ordinary, average consumers — recipients of goods and services, for the individualization of which legal protection of the designation is requested. The corresponding assessment is made from the point of view of the perception of this designation on a specific date — the date of filing an application for state registration of a trademark with Rospatent.

As has been repeatedly stated in judicial practice, the ban on registering such designations as trademarks is caused by the need to maintain law and order, protect historical and cultural values of society, protect moral feelings and moral values of consumers of goods. Public interests mean public order, the foundations of law and order. The principles of humanity are fundamental ideas in the field of implementation of human interests and values, for example, the principle of equality, the principle of justice, proclamation of a person, his rights and freedoms as the highest value. The principles of morality are moral requirements expressed in the most general way, for example, humanism, patriotism, civic consciousness. The principles of morality express the requirements developed in the moral consciousness of society concerning the moral essence of a person, his purpose, the meaning of his life and the nature of relationships between people (clause 4.2 of the Order of the Federal State Budgetary Institution FIPS dated 20.01.2020 N 12 "On approval of the Guidelines for the implementation of administrative procedures and actions within the framework of the provision of a public service for state registration of a trademark, service mark, collective mark and the issuance of certificates for a trademark, service mark, collective mark, their duplicates").

In accordance with paragraph 37 of the Order of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation dated July 20, 2015 No. 482, when considering the issue of the contradiction of the declared designation to public interests, principles of humanity and morality, it is taken into account that such designations include, in particular, unethical use of national and (or) state symbols (coats of arms, flags, emblems); anti-state slogans; words and images of obscene content; calls of an inhumane nature that insult human dignity, religious feelings of believers; words, the spelling of which violates the rules of spelling. Also, designations, the use of which in relation to certain goods and services may be ambiguously perceived by society due to the ability to cause negative associations in relation to such goods and services, may be perceived as "immoral" - designations that have negative semantics and contribute to the loss of reputation and lowering the status of cultural heritage sites (SIP-155/2023). Designations that contradict the principles of humanity and morality may include obscene (swearing) or slang words and expressions; obscene images; de facto provocative religious symbols; names of narcotic substances; any semiology of death, suffering, painful conditions, including the names of mental and infectious diseases.

It is worth noting that a designation that is not identical to the "immoral" element, but perceived by the consumer as formed from a similar element, also cannot be registered as a trademark. Recognition of one of the elements of the designation as contrary to public interests, principles of humanity and (or) morality is sufficient to refuse to grant legal protection to the designation as a whole, including its other elements (clause 8 of the Review of judicial practice on the application of subparagraph 2 of paragraph 3 of Article 1483 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, approved by the Resolution of the Presidium of the Intellectual Property Court dated September 20, 2024 No. SP-22/17).

The list of cases when state registration of a trademark may be contrary to public interests, principles of humanity and morality is not exhaustive (clause 31 of the Review of judicial practice of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 1 of 2021). If we talk about some examples, they are very well presented in the above-mentioned Order of the Federal State Budgetary Institution FIPS. For example: "the designation "In the Family Circle", registered in relation to alcoholic beverages, will be contrary to public interests, since by using the reputation of family values it can attract the attention of consumers to alcoholic beverages…" An analysis for the absence of contradictions to public interests, humanity and moral standards is carried out in relation to a specific product or service individually.

Existing or probable associative links that arise in modern consumers in connection with the declared (or disputed) designation are taken into account, based on the evidence available in the case materials (SIP-691/2018). The evidence presented is relevant if, on their basis, it is possible to establish existing or probable associative links of the very group of consumers to whom the goods are addressed, for which the designation is applied for registration or is registered.

The perception of the designation by consumers is taken into account in each specific case individually, in relation to a specific product (service) and based on the semantic meaning of the designation, taking into account factors, the presence and meaning of which is established independently for each designation (the factor of consumer perception, generally accepted world moral standards, national traditions and culture), since the list of such designations is of a general nature.

When refusing to register a trademark on the basis of paragraph 2 of clause 3 of Article 1483 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Rospatent must cite specific public interests protected by it, specific principles of humanity or specific principles of morality (the Intellectual Property Court pointed out these aspects in case SIP-891/2022). At the same time, harm should not be caused not only to public interests in themselves, but also to specific objects, persons, phenomena, institutions, the protection of a certain perception of which is covered by the public interest.

Sometimes, within the framework of a case, sociological examinations may be appointed or other evidence may be provided aimed at identifying associations related to a certain phrase, image or other element (SIP-793/2019). For example, Rospatent did not prove the common usage of the word "hempy", nor that the average Russian consumer has the knowledge of English necessary to translate this word into Russian, including as "hemp" (SIP-225/2023).

In this regard, one amazing case can be cited (SIP-17/2022): Rospatent refused to register the trademark "White Hand" to an individual entrepreneur, citing the fact that the Internet states: "White Hand" is the name of a Serbian extremist organization that existed at the beginning of the 20th century. This group was engaged in terrorist activities in the territories of various foreign countries (Serbia, Austria-Hungary, Guatemala). However, the Intellectual Property Court pointed out that the fact of the existence and activity of terrorist organizations with the name "White Hand" in Serbia, Austria-Hungary and Guatemala is not in itself a basis for applying the provisions of subparagraph 2 of paragraph 3 of Article 1483 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, and conclusions on the possibility of applying this rule should be based on a study of the relevant associations that arise in consumers, the nature of their perception of the disputed designation. As was evident from the case materials, Rospatent did not examine the issue of whether the designation "White Hand" evokes in modern Russian consumer association with the aforementioned terrorist organizations. In this regard, the IP Court upheld the plaintiff’s complaint and declared Rospatent’s decision to refuse state registration of the trademark invalid.

Let’s break a small stereotype right away — it is not at all necessary to involve a notary in order to form an evidence base from information posted on websites. In cases on the protection of intellectual property rights, there is no legislative requirement for notarization of screenshots: in accordance with paragraph 55 of the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 10 of April 23, 2019 "On the application of Part Four of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation", screenshots taken and certified by persons participating in the case indicating the address of the Internet page and the exact time of their receipt are recognized as admissible evidence. The "Plenum" says that evidence can be provided by a notary if there is reason to believe that the presentation of evidence will subsequently become impossible or difficult, including by certifying the content of the site on the Internet as of a certain moment. The court also has the right to view the information posted on a certain resource in real time.

Wayback Machine is a service that archives pages on the Internet using bots and allows you to view saved versions of pages. Roughly speaking, the platform allows you to see the pages of a site as they once were. It makes a print of the site that cannot be faked. The name of the online archive is translated as "Time Machine".

This raises the question: "Why do I need a notary when I can give the command to bots to capture the page I need, and the result can be reflected in a screenshot or even given to a judge to view in real time?" The question is excellent, but legal reality makes us ask an equally wonderful puzzle: "Does Russian law allow such an algorithm?"

Fortunately, judicial practice has long since developed a positive attitude towards the Wayback Machine service: back in the 2013 case (No. A53−17 108/2013) The 15th Arbitration Court of Appeal did not accept the arguments that the screenshots provided from the web archive were not admissible evidence. The "troika" of judges noted that the service has the legal status of a library, which is available to any Internet user. In connection with this, the appeal had no reason not to trust the information located on this service. The court also noted: "In addition, the site web.archive.org was created specifically to store information about what exactly the contents of an Internet page (site) were at one time or another. Considering that the said information resource is located outside the Russian Federation and interference of interested parties (dispute participants) in the said information resource is excluded, the appellate court finds it possible to accept printouts of the pages of the said resource, drawn up in the form of a notarized protocol of inspection of evidence … from which it is clear what content of the site … was posted on the Internet as of 12.07.1997, on 24.12.2012, on 29.04.2013." The court came to the following conclusion: since the parties do not have the ability to change the content of the information posted on the Wayback Machine, the information on the resource is trustworthy.

And then judicial practice picked up on the trend and has never deviated from the given path for 10 years. The Intellectual Property Court immediately supported the use of the Internet archive in the proof and since then has never doubted the legitimacy of using data from web.archive.org (A40−33 294/2014, SIP-612/2015, SIP-283/2017, SIP-489/2021). In case A40−206 553/2015, the arbitration court noted that the Wayback Machine is a publicly accessible site that is an archive for collecting copies of web pages, graphic materials, video and audio recordings and software. The archive provides long-term archiving of the collected material and free access to its databases for the general public. It is interesting that further on there is a recommendation to use the service when providing evidence on the part of federal government agencies: in particular, a reference is made to the (no longer valid) Letter of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia dated 28.08.2015 No. AK/45 828/15 "On Advertising on the Internet". In case A40−90 739/2017, the Arbitration Court of the City of Moscow stated in plain text: "The possibility of using data from the Internet Archive Wayback Machine service (archive.org) to confirm facts of legal significance is widely recognized by judicial practice." Information from the Wayback Machine is also successfully used in evidence in the Arbitration Court of Krasnodar Krai — A32−45 748/2019, A32−21 861/2020, A32−52 991/2021, A32−1139/2023, A32−5568/2023.

The use of the Wayback Machine service in arbitration disputes has a long-standing, stable and successful judicial practice. Therefore, it will not be superfluous to take a picture of the site page on the Internet through web.archive.org in case of detection of a violation of intellectual property rights on it.

First, it is necessary to establish the number of violations of exclusive rights.

Unauthorized use of an intellectual property object in several ways constitutes a similar number of violations of exclusive rights. For example, unauthorized processing of a work and its communication to the public = 2 independent violations. Or the reproduction of copies of several works on one material medium constitutes the corresponding number of violations. But there are often cases when the totality of these acts is recognized as one offense. This happens because the use of the result of intellectual activity by one person in different ways aimed at achieving one economic goal constitutes one violation of exclusive rights. Methods of unauthorized use of a work aimed at achieving one economic goal are recognized as a totality of actions committed within the framework of the plan to introduce the object into civil circulation without obtaining the permission of the copyright holder. For example, repeated placement of a copyrighted object on several websites or website pages within the framework of one act is one violation of exclusive rights committed with a single intent (Case No. A32−22 933/2020, considered by the Arbitration Court of the Krasnodar Territory).

Thus, it is necessary to evaluate all actions committed by the infringer and properly establish the economic meaning of each individual case and try to distinguish the entire set of actions committed. If this is possible, then we are talking about several violations of exclusive rights, if not — about one (for example, the "Plenum on Intellectual Property" in paragraph 56 gives an example when the sale of goods together with its delivery constitutes one violation of an exclusive right).

The second is to choose the form of compensation

. There are three of them:

• in double the amount of the cost of counterfeit copies of the work — in this case, the plaintiff provides information on the number of copies (goods), their actual price (at which the defendant offers them), and then multiplies the resulting amount by 2 (if it is impossible to provide such evidence, the copyright holder has the right to petition to obtain this information from the defendant or other persons);
• in the amount of twice the value of the right to use the work, determined on the basis of the price that, under comparable circumstances, is usually charged for the lawful use of the work in the manner used by the infringer — the plaintiff presents the calculation and justification of the amount to be collected, as well as documents confirming the value of the right to use: the copyright holder may submit to the case materials the license agreements by which the price of the right to use is determined, and in the absence of license agreements or commercial concession agreements, it is possible to present data on the value of the exclusive right from various sources or attach an appraiser’s report on the market value of the right to use the intellectual property object — multiply the resulting value by 2;
• in the amount of ten thousand rubles to five million rubles, determined at the discretion of the court based on the nature of the violation — this is where it is most difficult.

The plaintiff must provide a justification for the amount of the sum to be recovered, confirming that the amount of compensation required by him is proportionate to the violation committed, except in cases where the claim is for 10,000 rubles per violation. Therefore, if the plaintiff discovers 100 episodes of violation of his exclusive rights, he can file a claim for payment of 1,000,000 rubles in compensation without any justification for proportionality (the plaintiff can also expect that the court will not reduce the amount of compensation unless the defendant proves the fact of a single process of using the object).

When determining the amount of compensation, such factors as the fame of the work, the nature of the violation, the period of illegal use of the copyright object, the presence and degree of guilt of the infringer, the probable property losses of the copyright holder, the significance of the illegal use of the works in the economic activity of the infringer, and also — if we are talking about the infringement of copyright on the Internet — data on the traffic and profitability (including from advertising) of the site on which the copyright object was illegally used are taken into account (paragraphs 21, 24 of the Review of judicial practice in considering civil cases related to the infringement of copyright and related rights on the information and telecommunications network "Internet" dated 05/29/2024). The court makes a decision based on the principles of reasonableness and fairness, as well as the proportionality of compensation to the consequences of the violation.